Proposals to punish South Africans for alleged misinformation abroad raise a fundamental question: can a dispute over what citizens say become a threat to their right to belong? South Africa’s Constitution gives the citizenship debate a stark starting point: “No citizen may be deprived of citizenship.” That protection now stands at the centre of a political argument about South Africans who lobby foreign governments against policies at home. Eyewitness News reported on 8 October that Supra Mahumapelo, chairperson of Parliament’s international relations committee, proposed legislation enabling citizenship to be stripped in response to alleged misinformation abroad. He named AfriForum, Solidarity, Lex Libertas and the Freedom Front Plus, and suggested their Washington engagements could be treasonous. International Relations Minister Ronald Lamola supported action against misinformation and said the executive would examine possible measures. The distinction matters. Mahumapelo advanced the citizenship proposal; Lamola endorsed the broader call for action. The reported exchange does not establish that a citizenship-stripping law has been enacted, or that anyone has been convicted of an offence. For citizens at home and abroad, the immediate issue is the principle behind the proposal. If belonging to the country can become contingent on a politician’s assessment of one’s speech, the cost of dissent changes before a court ever hears a case. Mark Oppenheimer, executive director of the Free Speech Union of South Africa, has warned that giving politicians power over a critic’s citizenship would arm the very people being scrutinised . The Freedom Front Plus has separately rejected the proposed sanctions and said it will continue its international advocacy . These are the positions of participants in the dispute, rather than findings that everything said during their overseas engagements was accurate. That distinction is essential to a fair defence of expression. A person can support the right to criticise the government while questioning the evidence, judgment or political objectives of a particular campaign. Protecting that right does not certify the campaign’s claims. What the citizenship judgment actually decided On 6 May 2025, the Constitutional Court invalidated section 6(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act . The provision had caused adult South Africans to lose their citizenship automatically when they voluntarily acquired another nationality without first obtaining permission to retain South African citizenship. The order treated those affected as never having lost it. That case concerned dual nationality, not political lobbying. It nevertheless shows why citizenship cannot be treated as an ordinary administrative favour. The court required a constitutionally sufficient justification for its removal; the state’s power to regulate citizenship did not itself supply that justification. There is a qualification that should survive the political argument. Section 3(3) requires legislation governing the acquisition, loss and restoration of citizenship . The constitutional scheme therefore cannot accurately be reduced to a claim that every conceivable loss of citizenship is impossible. Equally, that legislative power is no blank cheque: the same Constitution establishes its own supremacy over inconsistent law or conduct. The practical question is what legal purpose a proposed punishment would serve, what conduct would trigger it, and whether the means could withstand constitutional scrutiny. Invoking the rule of law is the beginning of that explanation, not its completion. Speech has limits. A political label is not enough. Section 16 protects expression, including the exchange of information and ideas . It excludes war propaganda, incitement of imminent violence, and specified advocacy of hatred that incites harm. “Misinformation” is not a freestanding category on that list. Section 36 nevertheless permits reasonable, justifiable limitations through generally applicable law. Lamola’s argument, as reported by EWN , is that falsehoods cannot simply circulate unchecked in a sensitive diplomatic environment. The strongest version of that position deserves an answer: freedom of expression cannot settle whether a particular assertion is true, and foreign advocacy should not escape scrutiny merely because its authors invoke a constitutional right. But scrutiny requires particulars. Which statement is false? What evidence establishes that? What legally defined wrong is alleged, and why would the proposed sanction be justified? A broad accusation against several organisations cannot answer those questions by itself. Calling conduct treasonous is especially consequential. It should never be allowed to do the work of proving a criminal case. Nor should a defence of free speech be stretched into a guarantee that everything said abroad is immune from applicable law. The relevant conduct and legal basis must be identified before either